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EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECTS
OF TRADE REGULATION *
JOHN T. MTUUiE, JR. t
I. BASIC PROPOSITIONS
In order to bring the discussion quickly into focus and provide a
readily identifiable target for analysis and criticism, at the outset the
staff of the Conference supplied each participant with a statement of
propositions believed basic to the problems to be discussed. These
propositions received surprisingly few challenges. Comments were di-
rected principally to their clarification and amplification, although a few
participants did raise objections of a fundamental nature. I have re-
drafted the propositions in light of this criticism, and present them here
in the belief that they are helpful to any further discussion. They serve
both to identify the nature of the problems with which we are here
concerned and to suggest the area of possible solutions.
(1) International trade is best regulated by competition. As this
condition does not now everywhere exist, studies should be undertaken
to identify the impediments to competition, their causes and effects, and
the extent to which governments, through unilateral and cooperative
action, can and should remove distortions of competition.
* This Article is an unofficial Report of the Conference on the Extraterritorial
Effects of Trade Regulation held under the auspices of the Institute for International
and Foreign Trade Law of Georgetown University Law Center and Institut fuer
auslaendisches und internationales Wirtschaftsrecht, Frankfurt am Main, Germany,
in Washington, D.C., on April 5-12, 1962.
No one conference can provide either a complete understanding of the nature
and extent of the problems caused by the extraterritorial effect of trade regulations
or a catalogue of adequate solutions to those problems. But like the conference held
in Chicago in 1958 and the International Conference on Restraints of Competition
at the University of Frankfurt in 1960, the 1962 Washington Conference has served
the very worthwhile purpose of providing a forum for the candid and challenging
exchange of information and ideas by legal and economic experts from several
nations of the world who are appreciative of the problems that exist and warrant
serious study and conscientious effort to obtain solutions.
The discussions at Washington were sufficiently successful to encourage us to
invite the participants to continue the dialogue through responses to this Report and
participation in another international conference to be held, in all likelihood, in Europe
in 1964.
This Report has been prepared by the general reporter of the conference and is
published on his sole responsibility. It is not to be understood as representing the
views of any other participant in the Washington conference. The comments of
participants who wished to express their views on the report are set out after this
Article.
t Adjunct Professor of Law and Associate Director, Institute for International
and Foreign Trade Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1944, Clark
University; LL.B. 1948, Georgetown University; J.D. 1951, University of Geneva.
Member, District of Columbia and Connecticut Bars.
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(2) Enforceable rules of competition are socially desirable and
necessary to promote and maintain fair competition and the freedom of
individuals to trade, by assuring access to markets, labor, supplies,
credit, technology, and means of communication and transportation.
(3) Unilateral acts of governments directed to their own domestic
or foreign trade, and restrictive trade practices arising from cartels-
agreements among competitors-in the foreign or domestic trade of
one or more countries may have an extraterritorial effect and, conse-
quently, may restrain or prohibit international trade.
(4) All governmental action, whether permissive, regulatory, or
prohibitive in nature, which applies to the foreign trade of a country
or which applies to any important segment of the economy of a country
may have an extraterritorial effect. Governmental nonaction in these
areas may also have an extraterritorial effect.
(a) Where foreign trade is involved, the effect is direct and
ordinarily intended.
(b) The complexity and interdependence of the economies of
modern nations is such that an extraterritorial effect may be antici-
pated from actions which apply to any important segment of the
domestic economy, although such effects may be indirect and not
the purpose of the actions.
(c) The failure of any nation to legislate as to cartels has a
result similar to that brought about by permissive legislation. Car-
tels are thereby allowed to play a part in the foreign and domestic
trade of that country, with a resultant extraterritorial effect.
(5) To the extent that governmental or private conduct in one
country has an adverse effect upon the economic interests of a second
country, the latter has a proper interest in the control or prohibition of
such conduct.
(6) Governmental action which has such extraterritorial effects
is not invalid or unlawful under public international law for that reason
alone.
(a) Each country has power to undertake whatever measures
it deems appropriate insofar as its domestic economy and foreign
trade are concerned. However, the cooperation and assistance of
other countries may be essential to the effectiveness of certain of
these measures.
(b) A country's right to exercise that power, and the extent
to which it may exercise that power, may also be limited by out-
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standing treaty obligations and other international contractual
commitments.
(c) In the absence of a treaty or other international con-
tractual limitation, international law, as it exists today, has not
been worked out in detail as to the right of a country to take the
measures it deems appropriate insofar as its foreign trade is con-
cerned. This situation may lead to conflicts resulting from the
assumption and exercise of jurisdiction and sovereign power by
individual countries.
(7) As cartels-often composed of or utilizing combines 1-oper-
ate within the framework of existing governmental laws and regula-
tions, they may experience at a given time complete freedom, regulation,
or prohibition.
(a) Cartels are restrained by regulatory or prohibitory laws
only to the extent to which such laws are enforced.
(b) Export or import cartels may be permitted by a country
that opposes restraints of trade at the domestic level, when the
activities of the cartels are not contrary to the "public interest,"
despite the fact that they may bring about adverse economic effects
in other countries.
(c) Cartels may seek to evade government regulation and
prohibition by resort to the law of countries which do not regulate
cartels or which regulate them only slightly. Among the measures
which may be employed by cartels in their own self-interest are
the following:
(i) Cartels seeking to regulate competition in interna-
tional trade may provide in their contracts for the application
of the law of a country most favorable to their agreement.
(ii) Cartels may seek to evade the laws of countries
which prohibit or regulate them by employing flexible inter-
national arbitration machinery to settle their disputes.
(iii) Cartels may seek to evade the laws of the countries
which prohibit or regulate them by keeping their records in
other countries which will not require or permit their produc-
tion upon request of the regulating country.
(8) Where the activities of cartels or the domestic effects of their
activities bring them within the jurisdiction of a country regulating or
'A combine is here defined as a single enterprise, under one common manage-
ment, which has subsidiaries, affiliates, plants, or other facilities in different countries.
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prohibiting them, the cartel agreement gives way to the laws and regu-
lations of that country to the extent that the government of that country
is able to apply them. This is so even where the cartel agreement pro-
vides that the law of another country will be applied to determine the
legality of the agreement and the nature and extent of obligations
under it.
(9) Cartel agreements calling for restrictive trade practices in
international trade are undesirable and should be regulated. Agree-
ments fixing prices, dividing markets, setting quotas, boycotting com-
petitors, or requiring exclusive dealing should be abolished, and, where
not abolished, should be allowed only under rigorous supervision by
the governments of the countries concerned.
(10) Effective governmental control of the restrictive trade prac-
tices of cartels in international trade is not possible at present because
of the existence of numerous regulatory gaps arising from lack of co-
operation between the countries concerned. These gaps make it diffi-
cult or impossible for a country adversely affected to obtain access to
necessary data and jurisdiction over persons and property, or to compel
action by or impose sanctions on the cartel or its members.
(11) It is in the common interest of the countries concerned to
undertake cooperative action to reduce these regulatory gaps insofar
as possible, consistent with proper procedures and safeguards of both
public and private rights.
(12) In those cases in which a government determines that joint
economic activity by competitors in international trade is desirable, im-
portant interests being served thereby, appropriate measures should be
taken by that government to assure that such activities are consistent
with general policies under which restrictive trade practices are regu-
lated, and duly recognize the proper interests of the other countries
concerned.
(13) Available national and international means for regulating
restrictive trade practices in international trade-such as the investiga-
tory functions of national trade regulation agencies, and treaties of
friendship and commerce-are not being fully utilized in dealing with
these problems.
These propositions quite obviously do not end the discussion. But,
by their generality, they provide an adequate threshold from which to
enter upon analyses and resolutions of the problems. The structure
which has yet to be built can only be limned at this time. Its realization
will require detailed study and enormous cooperative effort.
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II. CASE STUDIES
The extraterritorial effects of trade regulations can be examined
from many viewpoints. One could, for example, limit the discussion
to a consideration of governmental actions having a direct and sub-
stantial effect on exports and imports, such as tariffs, food and drug
regulations, and exchange controls. The problem might also be viewed
solely from the aspect of private enterprises, acting alone or as members
of cartels. Again, an analysis might sensibly be restricted to a single
industry, the trade between two countries or continents, or patents,
trademarks, and copyrights. As imagination takes wing, it becomes
obvious that, if the discussion is to be meaningful, it must take place
within a frame of reference recognizable to the participants and suf-
ficiently limited to allow adequate study and discussion.
The Washington Conference established its terms of reference on
three case studies which provide examples of certain types of difficulties
now being encountered in the area of discussion. Each involves the
interplay of private and public regulation.
The first case is hypothetical; the other two are recognizable as
problems which are now exasperating diplomatic and commercial rela-
tions between the United States and other countries.
• Space does not allow a full recital here of all facts relevant to each
case. Nor is such an account, with its diverting details, necessary to
an understanding of the issues raised by these and similar fact situations.
A. The Joint Venturi
1. The Facts
Companies domiciled in Germany, Japan, and the United States
enter into a joint venture to exploit the pharmaceutical business in Latin
America through a company organized in Switzerland. Each partici-
pating company has previously engaged independently in that business
in Latin America, relying upon its own patents and trademarks. But
lawsuits have arisen among them in certain countries, and one of the
principal purposes of the joint venture is the termination of such liti-
gation by licensing exclusively to the Swiss firm the present and future
rights of the partners to all patents and trademarks in Latin America.
The three firms also agree not to compete with the Swiss firm in Latin
America.
The American partner is record owner of one hundred percent of
the stock of the Swiss corporation, holding fifty percent of the shares
in trust for the German firm and twenty-five percent in trust for the
Japanese firm. Incoming orders and profits are to be shared in the
same proportions.
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The partners also enter into another agreement providing for the
exchange of all technological information related to the business of the
Swiss firm and for the assignment to each other of existing and future
patent and trademark rights secured in their respective countries.
The agreement among the partners providing for the above ar-
rangements is governed by the law of Switzerland. Any disputes are
to be settled by arbiters appointed by the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris, France.
2. The Issues
(1) Are joint ventures in international trade necessary or de-
sirable? If so, within what limits?
(2) Should any country directly and substantially affected by the
activities of a joint venture attempt to determine its legality, or design
remedial measures against it, without giving as much consideration to
the effect of such action on other affected countries as it gives to the
effect of the venture on its own domestic and foreign trade?
(3) Should countries make any distinction in their trade regula-
tion between joint ventures made up entirely of their own nationals
engaged in foreign trade and similar ventures in international trade
made up of nationals of different countries?
(4) In determining the legality of a joint venture, should decisive
weight be given to the nature of the market which it is organized to
exploit-whether it is underdeveloped or highly developed?
(5) Should a country in which a joint venture establishes a cor-
poration through which it will operate recognize as a valid ground for
dissolution of the corporation a request for such relief on the part of
a member who is under compulsion of an antitrust order of a court or
agency of the country of which the member is a national?
(6) Should a joint venture or cartel be permitted to escape, by
means of arbitration, the application of the trade regulations of countries
whose trade it directly and substantially affects? ,
2 As originally conceived, this case more closely traced an actual factual situa-
tion. However, as the matter was pendente lite at the time the Conference took
place, the facts were altered in hopes that a realistic situation could be molded.
Instead, an inordinate amount of conference time was initially spent discussing the
facts assumed. This experience leads me to believe that participants in future dis-
cussions will grapple more quickly and meaningfully with the issues if they can be
shown to arise from actual factual situations.
The next two cases are more vivid because they are real. Each involved a self-
regulating industry engaged largely in foreign trade and regulated by the country
whose economy is most directly concerned by the operations of the industry. Other
countries object to the effect on their economies of the industrial self-regulation,
governmental regulation, or both.
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B. The Swiss Watch Industry
1. The Facts
Most Swiss watches are manufactured in small plants located in
the mountainous area of western Switzerland, where meager soil and
poor communications severely limit the ways in which men may earn
their livelihood. Because a large number of families have come to
depend on this industry, the Swiss government has been unable to
view its economic health with indifference.
Switzerland exports 95 % of its watch production. Consequently,
any regulation of this product, either by the members of the industry
acting in concert or by the Swiss government, will have an impact upon
the foreign trade in Swiss watches and upon the economies of those
countries to which Swiss watches or watch parts are exported for resale.
The situation in Switzerland can be summarized briefly. The
Swiss watch industry is bound by mutual agreement among manufac-
turers, assemblers, and marketers to limit the export of watch parts
and components, and, with a few exceptions for industries already
established, to refuse direct or indirect aid to foreign manufacturers.
The industry also seeks to establish minimum prices for watch com-
ponents. The purpose of this cartel is to assure the Swiss watch indus-
try its precedence in the world-wide watch market by refraining from
encouraging or aiding the establishment of competitors in foreign
countries.
The role of the Swiss government has varied over the years, de-
pending upon the nature and extent of the watch industry's problems.
At first, the government participated only in a financial way. In the
1920's, during a time of overproduction, the government guaranteed
losses due to devaluation of foreign currencies. In 1931, the govern-
ment became the largest stockholder in a holding company set up by
the industry, private banks, and the government itself to establish a
monopoly in the production of certain essential watch parts in an effort
to control their export to competitors abroad. In 1934, the govern-
ment established a system of licenses in order to limit watch production
in Switzerland and to curtail the export of watchmaking machinery,
watch parts, and components. From 1936 to 1951, public price con-
trols recognized and supplemented the pricing arrangements of the
industry cartel.
At the present time,3 export licenses may be required for watches,
watch components, and watchmaking tools and machinery. Manufac-
SFederal Order on Measures Safeguarding the Existence of the Swiss Watch-
making Industry, June 22, 1951, [1951] Receuil Officiel de Lois et Ordonnances de
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turing licenses are required which limit entry by newcomers into the
industry, but they are to be abolished by December 31, 1965. As a
complement to this easing of its regulation of the industry, which was
authorized in 1961, the government is obliged to provide a quality con-
trol, to assure that no harm comes to the reputation of watches exported
from Switzerland bearing the name "Swiss". This will be an important
function, as 90% of the watches exported from Switzerland bear no
other trade name. The watch statute also provides punishment for
violations of its provisions.
Many countries are affected by this regulation of the Swiss watch
industry. For example, the majority of watches purchased each year
by consumers in the United States are manufactured in Switzerland. As
recently as 1962, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York held 4 that various Swiss and American watch
manufacturers and watch importers had violated the Sherman Act and
the Wilson Tariff Act because of the impact of private regulation upon
American interstate and foreign commerce.
It is the view of the Swiss government that its regulation of the
watch industry represents an exercise of that government's sovereignty.
Consequently, it argues that any action by American courts which in-
terferes with the governmental regulation of the Swiss watch industry
constitutes an interference with Swiss sovereignty in violation of public
international law.
The United States view, by contrast, is that the activities in
Switzerland, whatever their legality there, have an effect both direct
and indirect on American interstate and foreign trade, and that the
American antitrust suit is designed to "roll back" that effect. Even
though that "roll back" might have an effect in Switzerland, it is not
for that reason inappropriate, as that effect is ancillary to the right of
the American government to remove restraints of trade in its inter-
state and foreign commerce.
2. The Issues
Despite their factual differences, this case and the next raise simi-
lar issues. For that reason, I shall state the issues after a summary of
the shipping case.
Ia Confederation Suisse 1239-46 (Swit.), translated in Report on Current Legal
Developments in the Field of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. EcoSoc CouNcIL
OFF. REc. 19th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 80 (E/2671) (1954).
4 United States v. Watchmakers of Swit. Information Center, Inc., 1963 TRADE
REG. REP. 70600 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1962).
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C. Ocean Shipping of Freight by Common Carrier
1. The Facts
The waterborne shipment of freight by common carrier in the
foreign commerce of the United States is regulated by private agree-
ments among competing steamship lines, known as "steamship confer-
ences." These conferences first appeared in 1875, as an effort to stabi-
lize an industry which had become highly competitive, with a surplus
of capacity brought on by the development of the steamship and the
introduction of scheduled sailings. These conferences do not include
tramp steamers, which do not ply between specific ports on a specific
schedule.
Over 100 steamship conferences are active in the foreign com-
merce of the United States. Some 24 American flag lines and 270
foreign lines belong to these conferences. Their basic purpose is to
reach common agreement on transportation rates and other terms and
conditions of carriage of goods or passengers.
The proponents of the conferences assert that they provide greater
regularity and frequency of service, more stability and uniformity of
rates, and better distribution of sailings.
The conference agreements are lawful under the laws of many
countries. Although price-fixing agreements have been held to be per se
unlawful under American antitrust laws,' the United States Govern-
ment, recognizing that there is some merit in the steamship confer-
ences, has chosen to regulate them by special law, rather than to outlaw
them entirely. Under the Shipping Act of 1916 and its subsequent
amendments,6 conference agreements are immunized from the anti-
trust laws, but only if such agreements are filed with and approved by
a governmental agency-now the Federal Maritime Commission.7 This
immunity exists only so long as governmental approval continues.
The fact that only ten percent of American shipping is carried in
American flag ships, including tramps and tankers, is some evidence of
the international impact of this legislation. About thirty percent of the
shipping carried by liners regulated under the Shipping Act of 1916 is
American. Thus, this legislation has a direct and immediate effect
upon lines flying the flags of other countries in which their owners may
or may not have their principal offices.
It has been suggested that the Shipping Act of 1916 has proven
of more benefit to foreign flag lines than to American lines. The Act
5 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
6 39 Stat. 728, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1958), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A.
§§ 801-42 (Supp. 1962).
7 39 Stat. 733, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (Supp. III, 1962).
TRADE REGULATION
has permitted foreign lines, formerly denied access to the foreign trade
of the United States by the existing conferences, to come to the Mari-
time Commission or its predecessors and request assistance in compel-
ling the conferences to open their ranks to new competitors.
Because deferred rebates, and certain other practices, were out-
lawed by the Shipping Act of 1916,8 the conferences 'developed the so-
called "dual rate" pricing system to attract business. Shippers who
contract to patronize conference lines exclusively have their goods
shipped at rates lower than those charged shippers who do not sign
such a contract. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co.9 raised doubts as to the
legality of dual rate agreements, even when approved by the Commis-
sion. Extensive congressional hearings ensued. The effect of the
Isbrandtsen decision was finally stayed by Congress. In October, 1961,
the Shipping Act of 1916 was further amended 0 to enable the Com-
mission to approve dual rate agreements, provided specified safeguards,
designed to protect the shipper and assure continuing Commission super-
vision, were written into the agreements.
Under the amended legislation, shipping lines subject to the act-
including lines flying foreign flags-must file with the Commission
copies of all agreements with other lines which affect rates and services.
This includes the conference agreements themselves. All amendments
and cancellations of such agreements must also be brought to the atten-
tion of the Commission. The Commission is empowered to disapprove,
cancel, or modify agreements which are unjustly discriminatory or
unfair, which operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United
States, or which are contrary to the public interest or in violation of
the act. It must approve all other agreements, modifications, or can-
cellations. The Commission may not approve any conference agreement
which does not provide for reasonable and equal terms for admission
to the conference or for withdrawal from it on reasonable notice with-
out penalty. Tariffs must be filed with the Commission and made
available for public inspection. Rate changes must also be filed before
they can become effective."
The Commission has not been given the specific function of estab-
lishing just and reasonable rates. As in the past, the conferences of
shipping lines establish the rates to be charged, without any government
dictation. However, the Federal Maritime Commission may, after
hearing, disapprove any rate or charge which it finds "so unreasonably
8 39 Stat 733, as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. § 812 (Supp. 1962).
9 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
10 75 Stat 762 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 813a (Supp. III, 1962).
175 Stat 762 (1961), 46 U.S.C. §§ 813a, 814, 817 (Supp. III, 1962).
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high or low as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United
States." 12
The act gives the Commission power to subpoena persons, books,
and records for the purpose of investigating alleged violations, and pro-
vides penalties for violations of the act.Y
Under the 1961 amendments, conferences are required to police
the obligations under their agreements and to adopt and maintain rea-
sonable procedures for prompt and fair hearings of shippers' complaints.
If the conferences fail to do so, they may lose the Commission's ap-
proval and their antitrust immunity..
Although Congress intended to regulate the conference agreements
as early as 1916, effective regulation was not attempted until fairly
recently. As a result, there are, at the present time, instances when
foreign lines have, with the assistance of their governments, refused to
provide the Maritime Commission with documents which the Commis-
sion believed necessary to determine whether a violation of the Shipping
Act of 1916 had occurred. It is the view of the countries concerned
that under public international law they, and they alone, have com-
plete sovereignty within their territorial limits. No foreign court or
agency, they argue, may compel the production of documents which
are located within the territory of another country if that country
refuses permission to export the documents.
On the other hand, it appears to be generally recognized that a
country can close its ports to ships which refuse to comply with its laws.
There are many historic examples of the use of this power.
The last two case studies are classic examples of a conflict of na-
tional interests. A cartel with headquarters in the territory of one
country has an effect in a second country. This results in regulation
by the government of the latter country, which the first country deems
inimical to local interests.
2. The Issues
(1) Where a country undertakes to regulate, on a continuing
basis, an industry substantially or entirely engaged in its foreign trade,
is it required by public international law to provide machinery for
reconciling such regulation with the interests of other countries and
their nationals who are substantially affected thereby? In this connec-
tion, can satisfactory regulatory procedures be devised so as to assure
proper consideration of all interests concerned, whether domestic or
foreign?
12 75 Stat. 765 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 817(b) (5) (Supp. IIL 1962).
1339 Stat. 728 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§826, 831 (1958).
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(2) Can aliens lawfully be treated differently from nationals when
a country undertakes continuous regulation of an industry substantially
or entirely engaged in its foreign trade?
(3) Should cartels, by contracting to apply the law of a country
favoring cartels, or by keeping their records in countries which will not
assist in their removal on the basis of an order of a foreign court or
agency, be permitted to escape some or all onerous regulations of their
anticompetition agreements by countries whose trade they substantially
and directly affect?
III. DiscussIoN
A. Joint Ventures, While Inherently Noncompetitive as Concerns the
Participants, May Be Desirable or Even Necessary
The first case study illustrates an attempt by competitors who had
been independently developing the Latin American market to eliminate
burdensome litigation among themselves in portions of that market
through a device which completely destroys any further competition
among them. The subsidiary agreement serves to effect a further divi-
sion of world markets by providing for the exchange of patents and
trademarks among the members of the joint venture.
1. There Is No Consistent Treatment of Joint Ventures
by Governments
Such agreements apparently would be lawful under Swiss law,
where the new corporation has been organized. They are possibly
lawful in Japan, 4 but might well be unlawful under German law.
1 5
They would clearly be unlawful under American law because they serve
to foreclose the American member from competing in important world
markets." Whether the agreements are lawful under the laws of each
Latin American country, I am not prepared to say. But such a varie-
gated reaction as can be identified sets the stage for conflicts between
governments as well as for grave injury to the participants.
Assume that an American court found that the agreement not to
compete in the Latin American market was an agreement in restraint
of the foreign trade of the United States within the meaning of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. Assume further that it ordered the Ameri-
14 See Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Pre-
serving Fair Trade, Law No. 54, April 14, 1947, art. 6, EHS LAw BULLETIN SERIxs,
JAPAN KA3; Fair Trade Commission Regulation No. 1, Sept. 1, 1953, id. at KEl.
15 See Act Against Restraints of Competition, July 27, 1957, 1 EUROPEAN PRO-
DUCTmTY AGENCY OF THE ORGANISATION FOR EURoPEAN ECoNoMIc CO-OPERATION,
GumiE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIvE BUSINESS PRACTICES D1.0 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
l6United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States
v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
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can firm to cease carrying out its obligations under the agreements and,
as a remedial measure, to undertake whatever measures were within
its powers to dissolve the Swiss corporation. The other partners oppose
the dissolution, and, when the American firm attempts to renew com-
petition, they sue it in Latin American countries for breach of contract,
demanding specific performance and damages. Each company and each
country pulling its own way, with little regard for the others, could
create a chaotic situation in the narrow sector of the world market en-
compassed by our case. A country fearful of this result might be forced
to refrain from the enforcement of laws properly applicable to anti-
competitive activities directly and substantially affecting its foreign
trade.
The internationalization of enterprise is one of the causes of the
difficulties resulting from governmental trade regulation. Through the
use of subsidiaries, affiliates, and flags of convenience, enterprises can
take on the guise of various nationalities in different parts of the world.
Yet, the effects of their private trade regulation activities are felt
throughout international trade. Whatever the practical economic rea-
sons for these activities, when a country attempts to regulate such an
enterprise or its activities because of their local effect, the impact of
such action may flow back along the lines of communication and control
into international commerce. While the effect is ancillary to that in-
tended, other countries do feel the impact of such governmental regu-
lation.
It is in this way that complaints arise against the enforcement of
American antitrust laws. Yet the antitrust decisions of the United
States courts contain no instance of an effort to regulate international
trade as such. The courts have acted only when there was evidence
that the agreements, conspiracies, or actions complained of had a direct
and substantial effect on the American economy. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America " provides no exception.
Modern international trade has been built up by private corpora-
tions which are in a position to engage in restrictive trade practices
without serious governmental interference, even by those countries di-
rectly and substantially affected. United States antitrust suits in this
area provide the principal, although perhaps uninfluential, exception.
This has been due in large measure to the fact that until recently very
few countries regulated this aspect of their foreign trade.
The last decade has witnessed an important evolution in this
regard. Important trading countries like Germany and Japan have
adopted stringent trade regulation laws, some of which have a material
17 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
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effect on international trade. Ordinarily these laws contain exceptions
allowing cooperative action by nationals in foreign trade, a develop-
ment which requires comment.
2. Some Governments Allow Joint Ventures by Nationals in Foreign
Trade While Barring All Others.
An anomalous situation exists. The laws of the United States,
Japan, and Germany authorize export trade associations in foreign
trade-joint ventures by competing nationals-, despite a growing rec-
ognition of the social desirability of maintaining competition in domes-
tic trade by governmental regulation. The export association might
even come into being because of import restrictions imposed by the
country of destination. Nonetheless, agreements among competing na-
tionals may injure international trade as much as similar agreements
among nationals and non-nationals.
As yet, there has been insufficient recognition of the responsibility
of each country for the creation and maintenance of competition in
international trade. Export associations are cartels which may be law-
ful in the country where established, but possibly illegal under the
antitrust laws of other countries directly affected by them. Within the
Common Market, for example, export associations engaged in trade
with member countries come under the regulations adopted pursuant
to articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty,"8 while the same export asso-
ciations would not be so regulated if engaged in trade with a non-
member country.
When export trade associations were first sanctioned by the
United States in 1918,'9 it was alleged that because cartels were the
prevalent mode of doing business in international trade, competing
American firms had to combine to compete with European cartels.
However, such need not be the situation today.
Countries which permit competing nationals to agree to restrain
competition in international trade ought to consult each other as to how
soon each might adopt a policy either of allowing legislation which
authorizes export associations to fall into disuse or of limiting its appli-
cation to trade with underdeveloped areas.
3. Foreign Policy May Call for the Encouragement of Joint Ventures
in International Trade
Unregulated agreements among competitors which serve only to
restrain trade by fixing prices, dividing markets, suppressing technology,
18298 U.N.T.S. 47, 48, 51 Am. J. INT'L L. 865, 895, 896 (1957), CCH CoMMoN
MA=T REP. 1111 2001, 2101.
19 40 Stat. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1958).
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and boycotting competition cannot be justified as part of a policy of
fostering competition. But the question remains: Are all agreements
among competitors so evil as to warrant their suppression, at the risk,
possibly, of retarding the economic development of international trade,
or of encouraging private monopoly or government enterprise? The
first case raises the question whether joint ventures in international
trade can ever be lawful in each and every one of the countries directly
and substantially affected.
The Honorable Teodoro Moscoso, United States Coordinator of
the Alliance for Progress, has maintained that joint ventures may be
desirable if there are appropriate safeguards.
I hope you will think about some of the problems this poses.
To me they are serious ones. For if the economies of Latin
America, under the stimulus of the Alliance, are to mature,
only to find themselves tied hand and foot by market re-
straints, then our whole program will be for naught ...
I suggest to you that perhaps there is a real opportunity for
creative and imaginative use of joint ventures and joint enter-
prises, mixing broad foreign equity participation, manage-
ment techniques and technology with local resources.2"
Mr. Moscoso did not say, however, what these safeguards might be.
This obviously is an appropriate area for further study and experiment.
One type of joint venture appears to have desirable features. A
firm from a developed country and a local firm from an underdeveloped
area join together to develop the local market. The former provides
know-how, patents, capital, and technically trained personnel; the
latter provides knowledge of the local market, untrained or slightly
trained labor, and the sales distribution system. These firms might be
considered potential competitors in the sense that the local firm might
one day be able to compete with the outsider. But the joint venture
may be able to accelerate the process, providing a social benefit in the
form of earlier fruits of economic development.
We must expect some loss of competition in every joint venture
involving potential competitors. But this should not be the sole cri-
terion of legality at every stage of economic development. A joint
venture may be necessary during the primitive stage of an economy,
yet warrant dissolution into viable parts, owned by the partners indi-
vidually, when it grows to a size where competition between the part-
ners is possible as a practical matter.
In the areas of the world where economic development is obviously
needed, there may be no alternative to reliance upon government enter-
2OAddress at the Conference on the Extraterritorial Effects of Trade Regula-
tion, Washington, D.C., April 5-12, 1962.
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prise. But apart from the ideological problems which this entails,
commerce in the guise of government-in-business raises many unique
problems. A government enterprise, whether local or foreign, may
well be opposed to competition, insisting on a monopoly status. More-
over, an enterprise owned and controlled by a foreign government is
not free from seizure by the local government. This possibility intro-
duces additional friction and conflict into the relations between the
nations concerned.
Private enterprise may also run a considerable risk of expropria-
tion by newly founded governments which are fearful of foreign domi-
nation, whether by government or giant business. There is a ten-
dency for nations experiencing newly won sovereignty to emphasize
their internal prerogatives at the expense of the free flow of goods and
services in international trade. But seizures of private property owned
by aliens are less likely to occasion serious intergovernmental conflicts
today than would seizure of the property of a foreign government.
Perhaps this very development enhances the current risk of seizure of
private property.
Under such circumstances, joint ventures have several virtues.
They can serve to spread the risk, to reduce local fears of domination
by an alien private or public monopoly, and to ward off some local
hostility against foreign capital by providing for local participation in
the venture.
Before imposing the sanctions of antitrust laws against a national
who is a participant, each country should undertake studies to deter-
mine the desirability and necessity of joint ventures and the proper
scope of their operations as a matter of good foreign policy. Equally
importantly, once firms are permitted or encouraged by governments
to participate in joint ventures, they should be advised, with some pre-
ciseness, of the scope of authorized activities, and allowed an oppor-
tunity to disengage, without serious harm, when the business has de-
veloped to the point where it is apparent to the governments con-
cerned that actual competition between the partners is feasible and
desirable.
B. Private International Law Must Be Developed to Assist in
Reconciling the Conflicts Between Private and
Public Power in International Trade
For purposes of the hypothetical case, the joint venture corpora-
tion was organized in Switzerland, a haven for cartels engaged in inter-
national trade. In a suit by the other participants to enforce the
agreement, Swiss courts might well give no recognition to the Ameri-
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can partner's defense of impossibility of performance based on violation
of United States antitrust law. Nor is Switzerland the only country
whose courts frustrate the competitive policies of other countries re-
lated to international trade.2 The fact is that such cases can and do
arise, partly because of an inadequate appreciation of the necessity for
cooperative action by nations in bringing about and maintaining com-
petition in international trade.
Another significant reason for the inability of courts to cope with
these difficulties is the primitive state of that part of private interna-
tional law which deals with the extraterritorial effects of trade regula-
tion. Those specializing in the discipline of private international law
should give more consideration to the tangle caused by private and
public regulation of international trade.
C. Arbitration Is Not an Appropriate Procedure for Determining the
Applicability of National Antitrust Laws in International Trade
An important feature of the joint venture arrangement in the hypo-
thetical case is the provision for arbitration. In this context, it is
necessary to categorize arbitration as a device which may be used to
escape national regulations intended to control anticompetitive activi-
ties. While it must be recognized that arbitration can often play an
important and necessary role in international trade by facilitating the
resolution of disputes arising out of contracts, nevertheless, a country
is often as interested in the contents and purposes of such contracts as
are the contracting parties. This is particularly true where the con-
tract is between competitors, and has a direct and substantial effect
upon the foreign and domestic trade of the very country whose regula-
tory jurisdiction the contracting parties are seeking to evade.
How can private corporations escape the applicability of antitrust
laws by arbitration? This power springs from a recognition of the
private right of contract. The present law of arbitration and the prin-
ciples determining the choice of law applicable to contracts appears to
be as follows: (1) the contracting parties can determine whether their
cases are to be decided by regular courts or by arbitration tribunals;
(2) the parties can agree where the arbitration tribunal shall be estab-
lished; (3) they can agree as to the substantive law which will govern
and which is to be applied by the tribunal; (4) to a lesser extent, the
parties are free to determine the procedure to be applied by the tribunal.
Local law may determine the effect which an arbitral decision will
have in the local courts. However, methods have been devised for
21 See British Nylon Spinner, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch.
19 (1952).
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getting around even this-the parties need never go to court. To as-
sure performance, provision may be made for establishment of a bond
through the deposit of funds with a bank. The simple deposit of the
arbitral decision with the bank is deemed to provide adequate authoriza-
tion for the payment of the deposited amount to the injured party.
Certain developments in the field of arbitration may limit the
possibility that anticompetitive contracts will be held unlawful as more
countries enact antitrust laws. The rules on arbitration of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce in Paris ' are an example of how
arbitration tribunals can be separated-both as to substance and pro-
cedure-from the legal system of any country. No cartel case has been
decided to date under these rules, and there may well never be a deci-
sion. However, because the mechanics of the rules could be employed
in a cartel agreement-with an appropriate change in the identity of
the arbitrators-, they are of interest to the discussion. The rules au-
thorize an agency of the Chamber of Commerce, at the time a complaint
is filed, to select the country in which the arbitration tribunal in the
particular case shall sit and to appoint the arbitrator under the law of
the country thus chosen. By this device, the seat of the tribunal remains
ambulatory until a term or condition of the contract is to be enforced
by arbitration. If, in addition, the contract does not specify the ap-
plicable law, then the substantive and procedural law applicable to the
contract may be left undetermined until the moment of actual litigation.
Through a system of coordination between leading arbitration
associations, a parallel attempt has been made to allow flexibility in
the determination of the applicable law until the moment when enforce-
ment through arbitration is required. At such time, if one or both of
the parties object to carrying out the contract under the law specified
in the contract, a commission is called together by the president of the
standing arbitration commission for the purpose of choosing an ap-
plicable law, presumably taking into consideration the possibilities of
carrying out the arbitral decision.
Private enterprise wields power in international trade. Competi-
tion provides some check to this power and, therefore, should be en-
couraged. But it is not proper to permit private enterprise to escape
accountability to the countries whose trade it directly and substantially
affects. Where arbitration serves that result, to that extent it is an
abuse, and can serve only to bring all arbitration into disrepute.
22INTERNATIONAL CHAM3BER OF COMREERCE, ENFORCEmENT OF ARBITRATION
Awmws 12-14 (Brochure No. 174, 1953), discussed in Walker, United States Treaty
Policy on Commercial Arbitration--946-1957, in DomKE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ARBITRATION 49, 56 (1958).
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A careful study of the present role of arbitration in evading public
trade regulations ought to be made by each country concerned. Means
should be sought by which ultimate accountability to governments and
responsibility for actions can be assured. One of the principal diffi-
culties in such a study, however, will be access to adequate records.
D. In the Case of Regulated Industries in Foreign Trade, Continuous
Provision Should Be Made for Effective Consideration of the
Rights and Interests Not Only of the Nationals and Aliens
Engaged in the Industry But of Other Countries Directly
and Substantially Affected by Such Regulation
Every country has experienced the fact that certain industries are
so essential to its economy that the public interest requires their per-
vasive and continuing regulation. It is in this broad sense that I here
employ the term "regulated industries." If the industry is directly
engaged in the foreign trade of the regulating country, the effect on
other countries of such regulation is direct and may be substantial.
1. Such Regulation May Well Be Lawful by Any Standards
The regulation of a country's domestic and foreign trade is an
exercise of sovereignty. Any discussion of regulated industries should
begin, therefore, with the assumption that regulation is undertaken on
the basis of what is believed to be in the public interest of the regulating
country.
In the case of the Swiss watch industry, the Swiss Government
concluded that the national interest required the protection of that
industry and the prevention of its migration abroad. Legislation-
intended to be purely domestic in its application-was enacted to assure
that the manufacture and export of watches, watch parts, and watch-
making machinery would be in accordance with this governmental
policy. No one could contend that Switzerland may not legislate as it
wishes within its territory. But the effects of the legislation flow out of
the country with the export of 95 % of the annual watch production.
Ocean shipping serves as the "life line" of maritime countries.
Even the United States, though less dependent on foreign trade than
many other countries, cannot be indifferent to the terms, conditions,
and adequacy of ocean shipping, particularly when there is evidence
that rates have been unduly raised in the absence of competition.
Each nation has the right to determine the terms and conditions
upon which ships may enter its ports. It can require the presentation
of documents; it can require that a ship and its personnel act in a
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responsible manner while in its ports. Should a ship be unwilling to
comply with applicable regulations, it may, in the absence of a treaty
limiting the exercise of that power, be denied access to the ports of
that country.
The shipping industry is regulated by cartels of competing lines.
Each country has reacted to this private power situation in its own
way. In France, national flag lines may be compelled to join confer-
ences. In the United States, conferences are tolerated, provided the
lines do not abuse the suppression of competition inherent in the con-
ference agreement. New lines are to be allowed access to the trade;
the conference agreement and all its amendments are to be made public;
certain provisions in the agreements believed inimical to American
trade are to be suppressed; and provisions must be made in the agree-
ments for the protection of the shipper.
Because the majority of American exports and imports are trans-
ported in ships flying foreign flags, regulation of all those partici-
pating in the American trade directly affects other countries.
2. Public International Law Provides No Adequate Solution
The problem of the extraterritorial effects of trade regulation has
become a matter of international concern only in very recent times.
Whether dealing with regulated industries or ad hoc public trade regu-
lation, the difficulty is the same. No guidelines can be found in classical
international law. The problem was so recently recognized that prin-
ciples have not yet had time to develop. Nor has their development
been encouraged by the fact that the community of nations is currently
experiencing a weakening of its power to originate and maintain inter-
national legal principles. Experience shows that specialized rules of
the sort necessary to resolve the problem of the extraterritorial effects
of trade regulation are usually not developed in international law before
the outbreak of an actual conflict; they follow conflicts.
Absent appropriate treaties, only a few generally recognized prin-
ciples of international law cast light on the problem. A country is not
to discriminate unreasonably between its nationals and aliens. Nor is
a country to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. There
appears to be general recognition of the principle of territorial power,
and a certain jurisdiction of a country over its nationals. However,
no state may establish legal rules which will be binding with regard
to persons or things situated in the territory of another state except to
the extent it has in personam jurisdiction.
These rules are so vague that they offer little help in a specific case.
In the absence of clear cut rules, it does not appear feasible to turn to
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international courts for assistance. Just as national courts cannot
create international law, international courts can only apply that which
is recognized to exist. There is no international administrative law,
and consequently no ready machinery to avert or remedy the conflict
between the policies and practices of countries in the field of trade
regulation.
There is a lack of consensus at present as to what regulation of
international trade by individual nations is proper. Even countries
which have enacted effective antitrust laws sometimes have difficulty
in finding common ground. These circumstances make the problem
more difficult, but not insoluble.
New treaties might provide machinery for the resolution of these
disputes between the signatories. They could require equal treatment
of the nationals of both countries and encourage cooperative action for
the purpose of eliminating trade restraints. But those existing bilateral
treaties, which date from a time when such problems were not im-
portant, provide inadequate language to meet the situation. In the
case of more recent treaties, where language may be adequate, lack of
imagination and energy has resulted in their not being applied.
3. In This State of the Law, Countries Should Voluntarily Provide a
Hearing to Other Countries Directly and Substantially
Affected by Continuous Regulation of an Industry
The problem of the extraterritorial effect of trade regulation might
arguably be approached by the execution of multilateral treaties. What-
ever its merits, however, this solution has proved unattainable, as evi-
denced by the fate of the Havana Charter." But even if such a formal
solution is still a long way off, it ought to be possible to develop in-
formal, flexible methods of dealing with the problem, which could be
molded to the practicalities of the situation, providing information requi-
site to making practical judgments and the machinery to carry them
out. The possibility of a greater role in this process for private persons
under government supervision should not be ignored.
In addition, much can be done by the regulating country to avoid
the conflicts in limine. In the case of industries whose regulation is so
detailed as to come within the jurisdiction of a regulatory body, pro-
vision should be made for allowing foreign governments to present
evidence and arguments, both when essential laws are to be adopted by
23 The Havana Charter was a multilateral treaty attempting to establish the
International Trade Organization. Although it was widely hailed at the time of
its conception, the Charter failed because of the refusal of the United States Congress
to approve United States entry into the agreement. See Gardner, A Critique of the
United States Foreign Economic Policy, in PROEHL, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERN.A-
TIoNAL TRADE 121, 138 (1959) ; Sohn, Proposals for the Establishment of International
Tribunals, in DoxE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATioN 63, 74 (1958).
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the legislature and when the regulatory agency is about to adopt regu-
lations or apply the law and regulations to a particular case. The
Federal Maritime Commission recognized this need in inviting com-
ments by foreign governments on its proposed regulations designed
to assist in carrying out the 1961 amendments to the Shipping Act
of 1916.
Existing treaties and agreements might provide adequate pro-
cedures and grounds for the resolution of disputes brought on by gov-
ernmental regulation, but such methods may be cumbersome, insulated
to a large degree from the governmental body effecting the regulation,
and unrealistic in the case of a sector of the economy subject to con-
tinuing regulation. Where such conditions prevail, less formal pro-
cedures should be developed, permitting arguments to be addressed by
one government directly to the regulating agency of the other gov-
ernment.
At first sight, it may seem demeaning for a government to appear
in argument before a regulatory agency of another government. But
this obstacle can be handled in a practical way which should avoid
embarrassment. The representative of the foreign country could come
from the branch of the foreign government concerned with the particular
industry in question. An attempt should be made to create a situation
in which peers are meeting in the administrative forum. If matters are
not resolved adequately on this level, then it may be necessary to make
official representations through the foreign offices of the respective
governments.
It is important for the foreign country's interest at least to be
heard, if not always as completely protected as that country might
desire. It is a familiar American experience that statements of posi-
tion perseveringly asserted have considerable persuasiveness in regu-
latory forums.
The legislature of each country should take a broad view of what
is in the best interest of that country's foreign trade. Regulatory
agencies, in turn, might well consider enlarging the concept of the
"public interest" which they are protecting to embrace the public abroad
which is substantially affected by the regulation.
E. Cartels Enjoying the Fruits of Anticompetitive Activities Ought
Not To Be Allowed To Keep the Records Essential to Account-
ability for Such Actions Away From a Country Directly
and Substantially Affected
Cartels, in effect, amount to private regulation of international
trade. They seek a haven in those countries which will not hold them
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criminally or civilly accountable for their actions. In some instances,
their documents are protected from foreign courts and agencies by laws
actually enacted to prevent the seizure of economic secrets by foreign
governments during World War II. In other instances, the local gov-
ernment refuses its support to the requesting nation as a matter of
policy, possibly fearful of "fishing expeditions," and loss of business
secrets. Perhaps it is even persuaded by the cartel to adopt and
persevere in this policy. Where the cartel is successfully immunized,
the effect may be that no government knows with any precision how
much injury to competition in international trade the cartel is able to
effect. Emotion and imagination then fill the factual vacuum.
What may be needed is a disinterested analysis of records, but
without public disclosure of business secrets, by representatives of the
governments concerned or by independent persons. These should be
individuals whose stature and position will enable them to report ob-
jectively and fully to the governments concerned their findings on the
questions spelled out in the terms of reference established for their study.
The regulation of ocean shipping by the United States under the
amended Shipping Act of 1916 is at present deadlocked by an inability
to obtain access to essential documents located abroad. This particu-
lar dispute could be overcome by informal cooperation without jeop-
ardy to the principle that each nation may exercise full sovereignty with
regard to the regulation of its own trade and the disposition of docu-
ments within its physical power. In the interest of achieving a mutually
beneficial end to the current disagreement in that industry, I suggest
the following fact-finding procedure.
The disputing countries would agree (1) to the employment of
compulsory processes to obtain necessary documents from sources
within their respective jurisdictions, and (2) to the appointment of
three judges of different nationality, meeting within a disinterested
country, to inspect the documents which are in issue. These judges
would certify a report answering questions of the Federal Maritime
Commission which the disputing parties have agreed are pertinent.
When necessary, the appointed judges might be assisted by experts in
the field. On the basis of this report, the American authorities could
then proceed to act under their own law. The report might also serve
as a basis for further international negotiations. Similar solutions
should and could be found for other disputes over documents.
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
The elimination of restraints on international trade should be a
long-range objective; it is unreasonable to assume that such restraints
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can be quickly eliminated. From this it follows that a broad, long-
range program should be established which seeks to progress toward
the ultimate goal by increments which experience and need make
possible.
Achievement of this long-range objective is made more difficult
when individual cases are decided without reference to it.
International cooperative action must be based on a realization
that in some cases a country may be called upon to assist another coun-
try in carrying out its trade regulation policies even though the assisting
country is not directly or substantially affected by the restraint of trade
concerned. Indeed, cooperative action might require that a country
suffer an economic disadvantage while assisting another country in
this manner.
Elsewhere in this Article, I have made certain recommendations
in the context of specific problems. The following proposals are of a
more general nature.4
A. Specific Case Studies by Cooperating Nations
Specific case studies should be jointly undertaken by the United
States, the Common Market, the members of the Common Market,
Great Britain, Canada, Japan, and appropriate international organiza-
tions. These studies would serve as a factual basis for cooperative
action against restrictive practices in international trade. They should
be designed to determine:
(1) The nature, extent, and effectiveness of private cartels and
governmental regulations in the export and import trade;
(2) The existence and role of price fixing, division of markets,
setting of quotas, boycotting of competitors, and exclusive dealing;
(3) The nature and extent to which practices restraining inter-
national trade are regulated or prohibited by existing law;
(4) The nature and extent to which regulatory gaps exist, as to
the cartels concerned, especially insofar as they make it difficult or
impossible for countries adversely affected by cartels to obtain access
to necessary data, to obtain jurisdiction over persons and property, or
to compel action by or impose sanctions upon the cartel or its members;
(5) The adverse economic and political effects of such regu-
latory gaps.
2 4 These proposals were largely suggested to me by the committee reports pre-
pared by those participating in the Conference.
19631
1116 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.111:1092
B. The Industries To Be Studied
Such case studies could usefully be undertaken simultaneously in
the following industries:
(1) Waterborne freight by common carriers in international com-
merce, with particular reference to the conference agreements;
(2) Wheat-and flour;
(3) One of the industries in which export trade associations oper-
ate under the protection of the American Webb-Pomerene Act;
(4) Sewing machines;
(5) Machine tools.
C. Abolition and Regulation of Restrictive Practices
On the basis of the facts developed through such case studies, as
well as data and other pertinent information available from existing
sources relating to other aspects of international trade, cooperative
efforts should be made to abolish price fixing, division of markets, set-
ting of quotas, boycotting of competitors, and exclusive dealing. Other
restrictive trade practices which cannot or should not be abolished
should be effectively regulated in international trade.
Analysis should be made of existing national and international
facilities for cooperation and control of such practices to determine
how they might be fully utilized in this endeavor.
Existing national and international agencies ought to be strength-
ened and more fully utilized to collect, coordinate, and disseminate in-
formation now publicly available. Agreement should be reached on a
cooperative basis, through existing means of international cooperation,
as to the practices which should be abolished or regulated in each part
of international trade. Where studies demonstrate that regulatory
gaps exist, steps should be taken on both bilateral and multilateral
bases to close such gaps. To enable a country to carry out its program
of regulation of restrictive trade practices, means of cooperative as-
sistance should be developed by which it may seek the assistance of
another country in obtaining documents, data, and other information
available only by compulsory processes.
Consideration should also be given to the possibility of achieving
international agreement in various areas, including the following:
(1) Regulation of export cartels to prevent their use as economic
weapons against other countries or their nationals;
(2) Proscription of certain types of conduct by cartels which
logic and experience show to be inimical to the public interest, such as
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price fixing, division of markets, setting of quotas, boycotting, and
exclusive dealing;
(3) Reconsideration of the ITO and UN proposals for interna-
tional agreement on restrictive trade practices;
(4) Harmonization of the restrictive trade practice laws in the
various countries insofar as practicable;
(5) Harmonization of the laws, regulations, and practices of a
country regulating an industry so as to reduce to a minimum the ad-
verse effects thereof on other countries;
(6) Development of effective consultation machinery- such as
that provided for in the treaties of friendship and commerce-between
the regulatory agencies of the countries concerned, to facilitate joint
action in the respective countries in such matters as investigations and
remedies, and to minimize conflicts between countries arising out of
the regulation of trade, including regulated industries.
COMMENT
GEm W. HAIGHT I
It is with some hesitation that I submit the following rather de-
tailed comments on Dr. Miller's Report. There is so much in this
document that is useful and constructive that the criticisms below,
standing alone, might suggest a lack of receptivity of new and chal-
lenging ideas. Such a suggestion, however, would be contrary to the
fact. What prompts the following observations is, rather, a desire to
qualify occasional statements that appear somewhat dogmatic, and to
call attention to certain aspects that may have been overlooked.
I. THE UNQUALIFIED NATURE OF THE PROPOSITIONS
Dr. Miller has stated that the "Basic Propositions" included in his
Report "received surprisingly few challenges" 1 at the Conference. It is
my recollection, however, that there were many challenges. More-
over, the debate was mainly in general terms; it was not directed to
these propositions in particular. As they are stated, it is apparent that
many of the propositions are too broad and dogmatic. For example,
t A.B. 1928, LL.B. 1931, Yale University. Member, New York Bar.
1 Page 1092 mipra.
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with reference to the first, it may be true in many instances that inter-
national trade may best be regulated by competition. But there are
many industries-such as aviation, shipping, coffee, sugar, tin, and
cocoa-where this is not the best method. These industries require
other forms of regulation. Moreover, it is not clear what is meant
by "international trade," "regulated," or "competition." There is and
always has been competition in the movement of goods across national
boundaries in the sense of national and commercial rivalry. It is dif-
ficult to conceive of such rivalry ceasing to exist in some form or other.
Whether competition should be regulated, however, and if so in what
manner, must depend on the circumstances of each situation. Where
commodity agreements or some other form of regulation are not avail-
able, is trade to fall into the hands of the strongest, or are the weak
to be protected in some manner? And if so, in what manner? Who
is to determine which traders are to survive and to what extent? Where
"competition" is referred to, is it "fair competition" that is meant or
any competition? These questions arise because of the unqualified
nature of the propositions. Unfortunately, the answers cannot be found
in them.
II. REGULATION OF CONDUCT IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
In proposition five,2 Dr. Miller states that a government has a
"proper interest" in controlling or prohibiting adverse effects upon its
economic interests caused by governmental or private actions in an-
other country, and in proposition six that governmental action "which
has such extraterritorial effects is not invalid or unlawful under public
international law for that reason alone." s Of course, every govern-
ment has a "proper interest" in preventing adverse effects on its internal
or external trade. But a government is clearly not entitled under inter-
national law to regulate conduct in foreign countries. Such countries
have their own interests to protect. They have a clear right under
international law to prevent other governments from exercising control
over their own proper interests. This is recognized in the amicus curiae
brief of the United States in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Mari-
neros de Honduras, recently decided by the Supreme Court.4 The
question whether one nation may apply its labor laws to the labor-
management relations on board foreign flag vessels where the interests
of the state of the flag in such relations are not nominal, but real and
2 Page 1093 supra.
3 Ibid.
4 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 42, McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 83 Sup. Ct. 671 (1963).
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substantial, is discussed at considerable length. It is said that the
"basic error" of the National Labor Relations Board
was its view that it need inquire only into the existence of
"substantial United States contacts" which would bring the
Empresa ships "within the jurisdictional coverage of the
Act". . . . In determining whether, and to what extent,
the Act may properly be applied to labor relations aboard
foreign flag vessels, the crucial threshold question is not
merely the extent of the United States contacts but, more-
important, whether the vessels have sufficiently substantial
connections with the flag country so that Congress cannot
fairly be said to have intended to overturn the established doc-
trine of international law and displace the foreign regulatory
pattern by the American standards.5
While the United States clearly is concerned with labor-management
relations on board vessels entering United States territory-for other-
wise it is hardly conceivable that the Board would have asserted juris-
diction over such relations-, the brief states that, in the opinion of the
responsible government officials, the assertion of NLRB jurisdiction
over foreign flag vessels would embarrass the United States in the
conduct of its international relations.6
The claim of jurisdiction over labor-management relations on
foreign vessels entering American ports is not altogether unlike the
claim in antitrust cases to the exercise of jurisdiction over the industrial
and commercial conduct of foreign nationals in foreign countries. In
both cases, the claim is founded on direct and substantial effects in the
United States, in the one social and economic and in the other merely
economic. In both cases, the claims are resisted on the ground that
the exercise of jurisdiction would violate established principles of public
international law. As a result, there are protests by foreign govern-
ments and embarrassment in the conduct of United States foreign rela-
tions. The exercise of jurisdiction by the United States in both situa-
tions would displace the foreign regulatory pattern by the American
standards. Accordingly, I submit, the limitations imposed by custom-
ary international law upon the exercise of penal jurisdiction over the
conduct of foreign nationals in foreign territory should have been recog-
nized in Dr. Miller's Report.
In referring to limitations imposed by treaties and "other inter-
national contractual commitments," 7 the report ignores this aspect of
international law. The reference to international law as not having
5Id. at 51. (Emphasis added.)
6 Id. at 49-50.
7 Page 1094 supra.
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been worked out "in detail" is related to the foreign trade of the state
concerned and not to the internal or foreign trade of other states. The
problem that arises is not what a state may prescribe for its own na-
tionals, but how far it may go in regulating the conduct of foreign
nationals, and hence the trade of their respective countries outside the
territory of the regulating country. In such matters, international law
is reasonably clear and does not need to be worked out "in detail."
Interference with the extraterritorial conduct of foreign nationals re-
quires justification under the objective territoriality or protective prin-
ciples of international law. Those principles are clearly defined, and
it only requires recognition of them by states in order to maintain
harmony and stability in this area.
III. THE ROLE OF CARTELS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
In the propositions,' there are frequent references to "cartels."
These are not precisely defined, but the statement is made that they
often are composed of or utilize "combines." The latter term is defined
as "a single enterprise, under one common management, which has sub-
sidiaries, affiliates, plants, or other facilities in different countries." '
Such a "single enterprise," however, is clearly not a "cartel" in the
ordinary meaning of that term, and equally clearly it cannot "evade
government regulation and prohibition" in the country where it is estab-
lished or where it operates. The statements in the propositions relat-
ing to cartels and combines may or may not be true, depending upon
the facts in particular cases. To put them forward as propositions
when unsupported by facts, therefore, appears unwarranted.' 0
Moreover, it is apparent from article 85 of the Rome Treaty " that
some restrictive arrangements among competitors affecting interna-
tional trade may be useful and permissible. It is thus apparent that
"cartels" may be good or bad, just as restrictive practices may be good
or bad, according to whether they are harmful. In fact, in England,
restrictive practices are not judged on a per se basis, but according to
whether they are harmful to the public interest. There have been many
cases before the Restrictive Practices Court in that country in which
restrictive practices described in proposition nine 12 have been upheld,
the most recent being the collective resale price maintenance scheme in
8 See particularly propositions 7, 9, 10, and 11, pp. 1094, 1095 supra.
9 Page 1094 n.1 supra.
10 No attempt was made at the Conference to examine actual cartel situations
beyond the shipping and Swiss watch industries.
1298 U.N.T.S. 47, 51 Am. J. INT, L. 865, 895 (1957), CCH CommoN MAR=
REP. 2001.
12 Page 1095 supra.
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the book trade known as the Net Book Agreement.' This agreement
is clearly a "cartel," but it is one that has been held to be beneficial.
While proposition seven 14 gives recognition to diversity of treat-
ment at the domestic level, Dr. Miller does not seem to appreciate that
the absence of prohibitions relating to exports does not mean that gov-
ernments are indifferent to the practices of exporters. On the contrary,
as the debates on the 1956 English act 15 show, a great deal of con-
sideration was given to the question in that country. At this stage
there appears to be an unwillingness on the part of many governments
to impose prohibitions on exporters that may impede their trade rela-
tions in foreign markets. It also appears to be recognized that govern-
ments controlling foreign markets should be free to deal with such
markets in a manner they think in their own best interest. The stage
may not, therefore, have been reached where agreement is possible
along the lines suggested in proposition nine. 6
IV. THE PROPER DEFINITION OF A JOINT VENTURE
In the "Case Studies," a number of questions are put regarding
"joint ventures." At the Conference, however, it was made abundantly
clear that the hypothetical case proposed as the first study is a patent
and trade mark pool, not at all a typical joint venture. This fact should
have been brought out in Dr. Miller's Report by referring to "such
joint ventures" or "such a joint venture," rather than to joint ventures
generally. There are clearly many joint ventures that promote or de-
velop trade rather than restrict it, and that are widely regarded as
desirable and legitimate.
V. THE FIRST CASE STUDY
In section III of the Report, headed "Discussion," there is a state-
ment that the first case study would be unlawful under American law
because the American member would be foreclosed "from competing in
important world markets." '" But under the Imperial Chemical and
National Lead cases,18 illegality would not be per se but rather would
depend on the extent to which American exports or imports are unrea-
13 1n re Net Book Agreement, [1962] 1 Weekly L.R. 1347 (Restrictive Prac-
tices Ct); cf. Kores Mfg. Co. v. Kolok Mfg. Co., [1957] 1 Weekly L.R. 1012 (Ch.).
14 Page 1094 supra.
15 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68. See 551 H.C. DEB.
(5th ser.) 2040-41 (1956) ; 552 H.C. Dan. (5th ser.) 234-38 (1956).
16 Page 1095 mtpra.
17 Page 1103 supra.
18 Urited States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. National Lead Co., 63
F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
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sonably, directly, and substantially restrained. From the facts given in
the first case study, it does not appear that there are any such exports
or imports. If that is the case, American law would not apply. Nor
is it likely that an American court would go so far as to order "dissolu-
tion" of a Swiss corporation. It might direct the American member to
divest itself of its interest in the corporation and prohibit performance
of the contracts, but any attempted direct interference with the internal
order of a foreign country such as ordering dissolution would clearly
be contrary to accepted principles of international comity.
VI. FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
Dr. Miller has made reference to the employment of flags of con-
venience.'" The legitimacy of this practice is recognized in the amicus
curiae brief of the United States referred to above." There is nothing
insidious or illegitimate about such flags. Moreover, the use of sub-
sidiaries and affiliates in foreign countries is not really comparable to
the use of such flags as Dr. Miller suggests. An enterprise does not
take on the guise of a foreign nationality by employing such measures,
except to the extent that the laws of such countries so provide. Nor
can it be said that the effects of private trade regulation are "felt
throughout international trade." They may be felt to some extent in
such trade, but whether they are felt and, if so, to what extent must
depend upon the facts of each case.
VII. AMERICAN ANTITRUST DECISIONS AND THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
In his Report, Dr. Miller states that American antitrust decisions
contain no instance of an effort to regulate international trade as such.
The orders of the district court in Imperial Chemical do, however, con-
stitute just such an effort with respect to the international trade of the
two defendant companies. They were ordered to break up joint sub-
sidiaries in foreign countries and to transfer foreign patents. The
reach of the decision in that case provoked the well known comments by
the English court in British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem.
Indus., Ltd.21 Moreover, the significant feature of the American deci-
sions with respect to jurisdiction over the subject matter is not that the
transactions complained of "had direct and substantial effect on the
American economy," but that the arrangements in each case operated
19 Page 1104 mtpra.
20 See note 4 .upra.
21 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch. 19.
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within the United States. In all of these cases, United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America 22 included, the arrangements actually so operated.
In Alcoa, for example, Aluminium Limited was shown to have worked
closely with its American affiliate in the United States and to have been
Alcoa's instrument for excluding imports. These facts were mentioned
at the Conference, and may serve to explain the decision of the Court
of Appeals which otherwise appears contrary to international law.
VIII. THE RELATIVE DESIRABILITY OF FREE COMPETITION
In the Report it is said that "insufficient recognition" has been
given to "the responsibility of each country for the creation and main-
tenance of competition in international trade." ' Foreign trade is, how-
ever, very much the concern of most governments; they are generally
alive to the difficulties of establishing and maintaining the positions of
their own nationals. Free competition in international trade, particu-
larly when it is largely permeated with the activities of state trading
agencies and government owned or subsidized entities, may not always
be desirable. Exporters in small countries may be encouraged to com-
bine in order to compete effectively with the nationals of large countries
and with state agencies. In view of the many complexities involved,
absolute competition may frequently be less desirable than some form of
cooperation. Perhaps export combinations are no longer necessary for
powerful American concerns, but they may well be for smaller countries.
Even for American concerns, some form of combination may frequently
be desirable in order to deal with the power of state-owned or -subsidized
entities.
Accordingly, the stress should more appropriately be placed on
international agreement as a means of minimizing conflicts and main-
taining an equilibrium in which all interests are adequately and fairly
represented and maintained. Governments should support their na-
tionals in their efforts to achieve such equilibrium, and should help to
defend their interests against predatory practices of foreign groups or
entities.
IX. GOVERNMENT SEIZURE OF ALIEN PROPERTY
The statement in Dr. Miller's Report that "seizures of private
property owned by aliens are less likely to occasion serious intergovern-
mental conflicts today" 24 appears to overlook the recent seizures in
Cuba and Brazil, and particularly the possible impact of the Foreign
22 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
23 Page 1105 supra.
24 Page 1107 supra.
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Assistance Act of 1962,25 amending the act of 1961, which requires the
suspension of aid to countries in which American interests are seized
without adequate provision for prompt and effective compensation.
X. ARBITRATION
There is in Dr. Miller's Report an extensive discussion of arbi-
tration "as a device which may be used to escape national regula-
tions intended to control anticompetitive activities." 26 It is difficult
for me to understand why so much is made of this subject. An agree-
ment to arbitrate disputes arising under a cartel agreement in a country
that recognizes the validity of such an agreement could hardly prevent
a court having jurisdiction from applying a governing antitrust law to
condemn the agreement. Under private law, such a provision would
not prevent the application of public law. It is inconceivable, for ex-
ample, that a court in the United States would hold that a reference to
Swiss law or a provision for arbitration by the International Chamber
of Commerce would prevent a contract that violated the Sherman Act
from being held null and void. Although emphasis was placed at the
Conference on the role of International Chamber of Commerce arbitra-
tion in cartel agreements, it has since become apparent that none of its
arbitrations have arisen under cartel agreements. Even if such a ques-
tion were to arise, however, there could be no doubt regarding the over-
riding effect of public law, subject, of course, to conformity with public
international law.
XI. "EFFECTS" OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Dr. Miller also makes reference to "effects" in other countries of
a government's regulation of an industry. This is a troublesome ex-
pression and one that is never defined. In some instances, it appears
to be regarded as the direct and proximate result of an act; in others,
mere repercussions appear to be contemplated. Thus, there is a refer-
ence to "the effects" that "flow out of" Switzerland with the export of
ninety-five percent of its annual watch production. Swiss watches and
parts are, as the Report demonstrates, cartel made and cartel priced.
But does the export of these products produce such "effects" in the
countries to which they are sent as to confer jurisdiction on the courts
of those countries to apply domestic legislation prohibiting practices
adopted with official sanction in Switzerland? Does export constitute
such an impact on importing countries that it falls within the interna-
25 76 Stat. 260, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e) (Supp. 1962).
26 Page 1108 mtpra.
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tional law doctrine justifying the exercise of jurisdiction, based on the
territorial principle, over acts outside that produce direct and substan-
tial effects-constituting an element of prohibited conduct-within the
territory? If so, the effect of every decision made in the production of
every product exported from one country to another might provide a
basis for antitrust jurisdiction. Such a proposition would reduce the
concept of jurisdiction to an absurdity. If Switzerland may legislate
as it wills within its own territory, can this freedom somehow be cur-
tailed by the mere fact that Swiss products are exported to other coun-
tries? Does the fact that labor legislation in the United States, permit-
ting the establishment of wage scales by the exercise of union power,
produces "effects" in foreign countries to which goods are exported
permit such countries to regulate the effects of high wages because they
are harmful to them? Dr. Miller provides no answers to such questions.
XII. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
At a later stage in the discussion Dr. Miller states that "No guide-
lines can be found in classical international law. The problem was so
recently recognized that principles have not yet had time to develop." 2"
But public international law has developed clear limitations on
the exercise by a state of its sovereign power with respect to the con-
duct and property of aliens outside its territory. It does not, for ex-
ample, permit the exercise of power in any form within the territory
of another state. The internal regulation of the manufacture and pricing
of goods shipped to another country may not be interfered with by an-
other state. At the same time, such internal regulation does not consti-
tute the exercise of power in the territory of the state to which the
goods flow. The entry of goods into the importing state can, in fact,
only take place with its consent. To admit such goods and then to
punish the foreign enterprises which have made or exported them for
having acted in their own countries in accordance with their own laws
would constitute an unreasonable and abusive exercise of sovereign
power. It would also constitute an indirect exercise of power in the
country of origin, as it would operate to impede the lawful exercise of
power there by the local sovereign. In every case where a conflict
arises which cannot be solved by negotiation, the matter should be sub-
mitted to an international tribunal for a determination of which regu-
lation should prevail in the circumstances. The proper application of
international law principles could thus be determined. But it would
indeed be surprising if such a tribunal were to hold that the internal
27 Page 1111 'upra.
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manufacture of goods for export could not be freely regulated by the
sovereign of the territory where such manufacture takes place.
Dr. Miller has stated that there are only a few principles, apart
from treaties, that cast light on the topic of his Report. I respectfully
submit, however, that there are clear rules governing the relations
among states, not embodied in treaties or other formal agreements,
which define the legitimate exercise of state power over aliens. A state,
for example, is internationally responsible for the abusive treatment of
aliens and their property. It cannot deny to them the basic elements of
due process, nor can it take their property without paying fair compen-
sation promptly and in an effectively realizable form. In the area of
jurisdictional competence, the practice of states in their dealings with
each other has resulted in a series of rules that are just as effective and
operative as the rules governing denials of justice. It is universally
accepted, for example, that the mere personal presence of an alien within
the territory of a state does not give that state a right to punish him
for acts performed abroad. Under the protective and objective terri-
torial principles of jurisdiction, a limited extension of power over for-
eign conduct is permitted, but the very existence and acceptance of
these principles demonstrate the fact that power cannot be exercised
without restraint.
This is also apparent from the fact that even if the United States
should have jurisdiction in personam over a foreign national, it would
have no right to punish him for having traded in his own country with
the Soviet bloc. Nor would international law recognize the prosecu-
tion of an alien on the grounds of race or religion. Far from customary
international law dwindling to small dimensions, the broad development
of "human rights," the expansion of trade and investment, and the
growth of direct relations between governments and private business is
compelling a growth and broadening of old concepts. Customary law
is thus an active, living force in international relations.
The rules governing the exercise of jurisdiction over the conduct
of aliens both within and without the territory of a state are currently
being studied and formulated by the American Law Institute.28 Ref-
erence to these rules may also be found in the decisions of international
courts, of municipal courts, and in the writings of authorities on public
international law. While there may be difficulty in applying these rules
in particular cases, their existence cannot be denied. They arise from
the basic fact that the sovereignty of every state is limited by the sov-
ereignty of every other state. This interrelationship among sovereigns
compels a mutual regard for the rights of others and a consequent lim-
2 8 See generally RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW oF THE UNIMn STATES
§ 18 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
TRADE REGULATION
itation on the power of the individual state. It is not correct, therefore,
to say that the rules are so vague as to offer little help in a specific case.
While there is admittedly no consensus regarding the right of any indi-
vidual nation to regulate international trade, it is clear that no such
nation can regulate the domestic trade of other nations. If its attempt
to regulate international trade results in such an interference with the
internal affairs of another state, it may be directed by an international
tribunal to cease such interference. Until states can agree on the situa-
tions in which one state may assert a regulatory control over activities
in another state, the mutual restraint that has long governed the be-
havior of states in the economic sphere should continue.
XIII. THE NEED FOR IMPARTIAL TRIBUNALS
Dr. Miller's suggestions that representatives of one state be allowed
to appear before regulatory bodies in another state may serve to amelio-
rate some of the conflicts and frictions that arise from attempts by one
nation to apply its penal legislation to the activities of foreign nationals
in foreign countries. However, it may be unrealistic to expect a gov-
ernment to appear before a foreign state's tribunals in matters affecting
the conduct of its own nationals within its own territory. Unless some
means of enabling all governments affected to participate in the appoint-
ment of members of the tribunal can be devised, a nationalistic outlook
is likely to predominate. It is to be hoped that municipal tribunals will
become more and more international in their outlook and behavior, but
some statutory direction might be required before this can come about.
The ideal forum for the settlement of international problems is thus an
international tribunal. Moreover, as the amicus curiae brief of the
United States in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras indicates,2" an act of Congress should not be construed to
cover the conduct of foreign nationals in matters that properly and cus-
tomarily fall within the regulatory competence of a foreign sovereign.
As was there said, a "failure to recognize, and give proper weight to, the
conflicting and competing interests of the foreign nations involved" so
might lead to adverse consequences upon the international relations of
the United States. As in the case of labor relations on foreign flag
vessels, the regulatory jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign in trade
matters is paramount. Conflicts only arise when jurisdiction is as-
serted over the conduct of foreign nationals outside the territory. Effects
within the territory from such extraterritorial conduct are not by them-
2 9 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras, 83 Sup. Ct. 671 (1963).
:3 Id. at 31.
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selves sufficient to confer jurisdiction; the conduct outside the territory
must be a "constituent element" of conduct prohibited within the ter-
ritory.
XIV. AccEss TO RECORDS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
In his discussion of access to records in foreign countries, Dr.
Miller cites no instance of a cartel investigation that has been frustrated
by inability to obtain information regarding facts essential to a prosecu-
tion apart from the current investigations of the shipping industry.
If there are instances in which cartels have defied investigation by stor-
ing their records in search-free havens, the facts have not been presented.
Even if there are such instances, however, they would not justify a
general license to governments to obtain information from business
entities in foreign countries regarding their activities in such countries.
In the case of the shipping investigation, official statements by British
officials in the House of Commons in the summer of 1962 show how
strong the objection is in that country to the unilateral assertion by the
United States of a right to regulate an industry that is predominantly
non-American.3
XV. "BENEFICIAL" RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
Dr. Miller has recommended studies on the basis of which "co-
operative efforts should be made to abolish price fixing, division of
markets, setting of quotas, boycotting of competitors, and exclusive
dealing." 32 He seems to assume that these practices will generally be
regarded as requiring abolition. However, such is not the case today.
Some of these practices, as noted above, may in certain circumstances-
such as price fixing, setting quotas, and exclusive dealing-be regarded
as beneficial. It would be difficult to obtain agreement that they should
be per se offenses. Smaller states may benefit by having their nationals
participate in international arrangements that provide benefits for them
in return for economic concessions on their part. Even larger states,
such as the United Kingdom, may consider price fixing in international
trade of benefit to their nationals. In the case of the rubber tire indus-
try, for example, the Monopolies Commission found that price fixing
arrangements with the United States and French companies were not
contrary to the public interest of the United Kingdom."3 On the con-
trary, the Commission found that having a domestic tire industry which
31 See 659 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 400-08 (1962).
32 Page 1116 mtpra.
83 Report on the Supply and Export of Pneumatic Tyres, 3 MoNo mo s &
REsmIcTva PRACTIcES Comz' REP. 134 (1955).
TRADE REGULATION
could be policed internally in accordance with British law would enable
British companies to obtain fair prices for their products abroad, and
that the alternative might be ruinous competition with the far more
powerful American companies. In particular instances, therefore, these
practices may benefit rather than harm the public. Even the German
anti-cartel law and the Rome Treaty recognize that such practices may
be justified.
Before any recommendations are made, therefore, there should be
a showing that these particular practices in the particular studies under-
taken are harmful, and that there is a lack of cooperation among gov-
ernments in dealing with them. For example, studies are now being
made by the EEC Commission of various types and aspects of exclusive
dealing. There are indications that certain categories of exclusive deal-
ing arrangements will be exempted as a class under article 85 (3) of the
Rome Treaty,34 and that certain others will not be considered as falling
under article 85(1).11 In view of the complex nature of international
trade, particularly in an area as highly developed as the European
Common Market, it would appear unwise to be too dogmatic on this
subject. There may also be situations, as the conference agreements in
the shipping industry demonstrate, in which price fixing and the setting
of quotas may be acceptable. In these respects, it seems to me, Dr.
Miller's Report is too dogmatic and doctrinaire.
COMMENT
Jos pa J. A. ELs f
I have been invited to submit my comments on Dr. Miller's Report,
which deals with a wide variety of subjects. It is my intention to limit
myself to such general observations as will reflect the difference in
approach to the problems connected with extraterritorial application of
trade regulation legislation as viewed by Dr. Miller and by myself.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JURISDICTION
Dr. Miller, although recognizing the existence of certain principles
of international law which limit the power of a state to apply its laws
unilaterally to acts which have been performed outside its national ter-
34298 U.N.T.S. 48, 51 Am. J. INT'L L. 865, 895, CCH CommoN MARKET REP.
2051.
35 298 U.N.T.S. 47, 51 Am. 3. INT'L L. 865, 895, CCH CommoN MARKET REP.
112011.
t Meester in de Rechten 1939, University of Nijmegen. Member, Bar of The
Hague, Netherlands.
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ritory, does not always seem to give full credit to the existence of those
principles.
It cannot be denied that jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty,
and that the exercise of jurisdiction can never go beyond the limits of
sovereignty itself. Jurisdiction over aliens in criminal matters, unless
based on the protective principle, must be grounded upon the commis-
sion of a crime in the national territory. The mere fact that an act
radiates effects upon foreign territory is not sufficient basis for an as-
sumption of jurisdiction by the foreign state unless, in the words of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, "one of the constituent ele-
ments of the offense, and more especially its effects, have taken place
there."' In order to vest jurisdiction in the foreign state, therefore,
the effects must be a constituent element of the crime. Moreover, the
Case of the S.S. "Lotus"2 dealt with clearly defined physical effects and
with an act that was considered criminal in both states. None of those
elements can be found in the case of economic offenses which involve
acts performed outside the territory.
This limitation applies not only to jurisdiction in criminal cases,
but generally to jurisdiction in all matters of public law. The excep-
tion recognized by states applying the protective principle is limited to
a small and well defined category of cases.
Let us suppose that under Netherlands law it is forbidden to build
houses within ten kilometres of an airport. Let us further assume that
there is an airport in the Netherlands in the immediate vicinity of the
Belgian border. On the Belgian side of the border, buildings are being
constructed well within the distance of ten kilometres of the airport.
The existence of those buildings would endanger the safety of the ap-
proaches to the airport, and the state of the Netherlands would cer-
tainly be interested in having those buildings removed. Nevertheless,
it is absolutely clear that the Netherlands would lack jurisdiction to
punish the Belgian builders for having built within ten kilometres of
an airport. This result would not be changed if the Belgian constructors
were apprehended in the Netherlands. The direct effect of the estab-
lishment of the buildings upon the safety of the Netherlands airport is
insufficient to give such jurisdiction. With still more reason, the
Netherlands government would not be entitled under international law
to order the Belgian constructors to stop building or to demolish the
buildings which they have already completed. Nobody could seriously
contend that such assumption of jurisdiction by the Netherlands would
not constitute a most serious infringement of Belgian sovereignty. The
' Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 23 (1927).
2 Ibid.
TRADE REGULATION
way for the Netherlands government to proceed would be to address
itself to the Belgian government, asking that government's cooperation
in keeping the lanes of approach to the Netherlands airport free. If
this wish of the Netherlands government is consistent with the policy
of the Belgian government, the Belgian government would decide, of
its own free will, to take appropriate measures. But the Belgian gov-
ernment would only take such measures if they were in fact consistent
with Belgian policy. If the Belgian government refuses to act, the
Netherlands government would have to meet the situation in some other
way, even possibly by moving the airport away from the border.
II. UNITED STATES V. ALUMINUM Co. OF AMERICA 3
Dr. Miller accepts the Alcoa case as a correct statement of inter-
national law. This view, however, has not been generally accepted by
European jurists. Reference may be made to the authoritative state-
ments by Professor R. Y. Jennings:
This is, indeed, a startling projection of the objective
test of territoriality; for in this new guise it apparently com-
prehends the exercise of jurisdiction over agreements made
abroad, by foreigners with foreigners, provided only that the
agreement was intended to have repercussions and did in fact
have some repercussions upon American imports or exports;
and this though it is acknowledged in the judgment that such
repercussions may be the result of "almost any limitation on
the supply of goods" in countries trading with the United
States.4
Professor Jennings continues:
[I] t may, with respect, be submitted that the Alcoa pattern of
case goes too far when "jurisdiction" is assumed over for-
eigners' foreign agreements, merely because it has been possi-
ble to allege some "effects" on United States imports or ex-
ports, and because the agreement would have been illegal if
made in the United States. This kind of jurisdiction seems
to offend in two ways. First, since this jurisdiction is rested
by the court on the objective test of territorial jurisdiction, it
must be kept within the confines of that concept. But to ex-
tend that concept to cover effects in the sense of mere reper-
cussions-sometimes repercussions ancillary to the purpose
of the scheme as in the Alcoa case-is not only to extend it
beyond the limits covered by authority but also to reduce it
to an absurdity. Practically unlimited extraterritorial juris-
3 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
4 Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws,
[1957] BRiT. YB. INT'L L. 146, 165-66 (1958).
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diction cannot reasonably be founded on a territorial prin-
ciple. Secondly, even allowing a most liberal view of the limits
of extraterritorial jurisdiction, these cases still offend against
the ultimate limit because they are an attempt to export into
other countries and to make operate there what are after all
peculiarly American political notions.5
Professor J. N. W. Verzijl states:
The judicial order to Aluminium Ltd. itself was there-
fore, in my opinion, simply an "international nullity." And
how could that order ever be directly enforced without a clear
infringement of Canada's territorial sovereignty? Indirect
attempts to enforce it, for instance by bringing a criminal
prosecution against, or taking into custody, any officials of
Aluminium Ltd. who might enter the territory of the United
States are so unlikely and in such flagrant violation of the de-
limitation of criminal jurisdictions under international law,
that such a measure scarcely enters into the discussion, even
though it seems exceptionally and quite wrongly to have oc-
curred.6
To this should be added the comment of Dr. Rudolf Mueller that
"acts of foreigners are subject to the penal provisions only where they
are committed in the state," and that "there is hardly any doubt that
the territorial principle applies" in international administrative law.'
III. LACK OF A UNIFORM PHILOSOPHY ON RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES
Another basic fact to which insufficient weight is attached by Dr.
Miller is that there is amongst civilized nations no uniform philosophy
on restrictive business practices. He proceeds from the supposition
that such practices are necessarily bad and, therefore, goes on to say
that governments should cooperate to put an end to those practices in
international trade.
Dr. Miller does not sufficiently take into account that such co-
operation can only be asked in those cases in which national policies
coincide. If in any given case the policies would not coincide, but
would be completely different-as often happens to be the case-, the
guiding principle should be that each state should have full respect for
the other state's sovereignty. A state should not, in those circumstances,
B Id. at 175.
6 Verzijl, The Controversy Regarding the So-Called Extraterritorial Effect of the
American Antitrust Laws, 8 NET1rERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 3, 17 (1961).
7 Mueller, Antitrust Problems in Connection With Dealing With Common Market
Countries, Address at the Edinburgh Conference, 1962.
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endeavor fo apply its own laws unilaterally to acts committed outside
its national boundaries by non-nationals. Let us take an example con-
cerning price-fixing arrangements. In the United States, horizontal
price fixing is considered illegal per se; 8 in the Netherlands it is
not. This cannot be construed as a failure by the Netherlands to enact
prohibitory legislation in the field. The system which is laid down in
the Netherlands law is the result of a positive policy decision. As an
indication of how this policy operates, reference may be made to the
1961 yearly report of the Netherlands government to Parliament con-
cerning the application of the Netherlands Economic Competition Law:
Cartel policy was again last year directed largely toward main-
taining the policy of price stabilization. In this connection
mention should first of all be made of the fact that, after the
revaluation of the guilder, a letter was sent to 168 price cartels
enquiring into the effect of the revaluation of the level of the
fixed cartel prices. Only where it was certain that the cartel
price level could not be affected by the revaluation was the
letter not sent to the cartel concerned.
In all, twenty-seven price cartels had lowered their cartel
prices as a result of the revaluation. In all these cases the full
advantage of the revaluation proved to have been passed on in
the lower cartel prices. The other cartels to whom the letter
was sent replied that for the time being the revaluation would
not occasion any lowering of cartel prices.
Failure to lower cartel prices following the revaluation
was held to be acceptable on the basis of, inter alia, one or
more of the following arguments: a) no imported base and or
ancillary materials are used to manufacture the product whose
price is regulated by the cartel; b) in so far as such materials
are imported, they come solely from Western Germany, so
that no advantage has accrued from the revaluation; c) the
import contracts are expressed in guilders, and the foreign
suppliers have seen no occasion to revise the guilder price;
d) following the revaluation, the foreign suppliers have in-
creased their prices--expressed in their own currencies-to
such an extent as to offset the advantage accruing from the
revaluation; e) the advantage accruing from the revaluation
is offset for the members of the cartel by a recent increase in
external costs which has not been passed on. In these cases,
therefore, the revaluation has meant that a price increase can
be dispensed with; f) the advantage accruing from the re-
valuation has merely helped to make production less unprofit-
able than hitherto.
In the case of each arrangement, the reasons given for
not applying a price reduction were examined to see whether
8 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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they were acceptable in the light of the price stabilization pol-
icy. In six cases a further investigation proved necessary.
At the end of the year under review, no decision had yet been
taken in three cases.
Quite apart from the concern with price cartels from the
point of view of the revaluation, many changes in cartel prices
were tested against the criteria of the price stabilization policy
during the year under review. In sixty cases these changes
proved to be unobjectionable. In a few cases the proposed
cartel price increases were not put into effect because the cartel
concerned had ascertained in advance that the increase would
be open to objection from the price policy point of view. In
a few other cases, increases which had already been put into
effect were cancelled in the light of the objections raised.'
Further, it is of interest to note that a study had been made of
horizontal minimum price arrangements and exclusive dealing arrange-
ments, with a view to deciding whether it would be advisable to issue
a general declaration of non-binding with regard to such arrange-
ments.10 As a result of this study, the Netherlands government de-
cided not to issue such a declaration concerning those two types of
contracts because the admissibility of such arrangements cannot be de-
cided upon otherwise than on a case-to-case basis, depending on the
concrete circumstances in each case. A general declaration of non-
binding would, therefore, necessarily have to be accompanied by pro-
vision for exemptions, which would have to be granted in a relatively
large number of cases.
It is clear that if the United States were to request the Netherlands
to take action against price-fixing arrangements in the Netherlands for
the reason that they have an effect in America which the American
Government deems unfavorable, such interest of the American Govern-
ment would have to yield to the national policy established by the
Netherlands government. Any attempt by the United States to punish
Dutch subjects for having entered into horizontal price fixing arrange-
ments would be a clear interference with Netherlands sovereignty.
IV. OBJECTION TO UNILATERAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN
ANTITRUST LAWS
Dr. Miller makes mention of protests made by foreign govern-
ments to the American Government in connection with the unilateral
application of American antitrust law to acts committed by non-
9 THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT, 1961 ANNUAL REPORT TO PARLIAMENT (trans-
lated by the author).
10 Ibid.
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Americans outside of the American national territory. These protests
are clear evidence that among a great number of nations the extraterri-
torial application of American antitrust laws is considered to be incon-
sistent with accepted principles of international law.
If any government believes that its interests require international
cooperation in the field of restrictive business practices, the first step
would seem to be to ascertain how far its national policy coincides with
the national policy of the other states involved. As far as those poli-
cies coincide, the other governments involved might be asked to take
such measures within their own territories as would be consistent with
their national policies. Only if mutual respect is shown for the sov-
ereignty of other states can an atmosphere be created in which efficient
and beneficial cooperation can take place. An attempt by any one state
to try to push the extraterritorial application of its national law to the
limits and to try to enforce such law to the point that other states,
either through legislation as is the case with section 39 of the Nether-
lands Economic Competition Law,'" or through the judiciary as has
been the case in England,'12 take measures to forbid compliance with
orders given by that state would hardly provide an adequate basis for
creating sufficient confidence to attain the ends of international co-
operation.
An example from actual practice is the attitude of the Netherlands
government-and its attitude is almost identical with that of many
other governments-as evidenced by its protest in the third of the
cases mentioned under the case studies in Dr. Miller's Report.13 This
protest includes the following:
In his Note of March 7, 1960, the Netherlands Ambas-
sador already expressed the grave concern of the Netherlands
Government about a similar action by a Grand Jury of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The State Department replies of March 25 and July 6, 1960,
did not remove this concern.
For the same reasons as those contained in the Ambas-
sador's note of March 7, the Netherlands Government is
greatly concerned about the above mentioned Order of the
Federal Maritime Board. Again it appears that proceedings
are being instituted against Netherlands companies in connec-
tion with activities essentially falling within the jurisdiction
11 Economic Competition Act, June 28, 1956, as amended by the Act of July 16,
1958, § 39, 2 EUROPEAN PRODUCTnTY AGENCY OF THE ORGANISATION FOR EUROPEAN
ECONomC COOPERATION, GUIDE To LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE Busnmss PRACTiCEs
NL1.0 (Neth.).
12 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch. 19
(1952).
13 Page 1100 supra.
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of their home country and that production is being required
of documents concerning those activities. The Netherlands
Government would be unable to accept jurisdiction of a United
States Court or agency in this matter and reserves its right
to hold its own laws applicable. 4
V. THE NEED To ASCERTAiN POINTS OF COMMON INTEREST
The recent history of European integration shows that even among
nations so closely connected as the six Common Market countries the
establishment of common rules on competition in trade between the
member states is a very complicated and delicate task. The Rome
Treaty contains in articles 85 to 90 "5 only the most basic rules ap-
plicable to enterprises. So far, the implementing Regulations which
have been issued contain mainly rules on form and procedure; the sub-
stantive rules which will give shape to the European Commission's
competition policy must be developed on a case-by-case basis in the
years to come. It would be unrealistic to expect in a larger interna-
tional field that general agreement among nations can be founded on
the basis of the broadly worded assumptions set forth in Dr. Miller's
Report. This is particularly true in the case of joint ventures which
promote rather than restrain trade, of exclusive dealing, and even of
price fixing and quota arrangements that are not abusive. I submit
that the first condition for achieving international cooperation, there-
fore, would seem to be to ascertain the existence of points of common
interest between states and to formulate uniform policies, those being
the only bases on which international cooperation can exist.
14 Note From the Netherlands Ambassador to the Secretary of State, Novem-
ber 1, 1960.
15 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-50, 51 Am. J. INT'L L. at 895-97, CCH CoMN MoAK=T
REP. 1 2001-2737.
